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This study investigates whether gender diversity in the roles of executives,
boards of supervisors and management impacts real earnings management dur-
ing the bullish and bearish periods from 2000 to 2017. The sample is separated
by bullish (11,616 firm-year observations) and bearish (14,436 firm-year obser-
vations) periods. The results suggest that female participation on supervisory
boards and executives tend to kerb real earnings management during bearish
and bullish periods. Another important finding is that female CEOs are more
cautious in real earnings manipulation due to their risk-averse nature during
the bearish period, while female CFOs are more likely to constrain real earn-
ings management in the bullish period. This study failed to find the relation of
gender diversity on boards of management to real earnings management; how-
ever, the study has found that female executives (excluding CEOs and CFOs)
who are also directors are more likely to limit earnings manipulation.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Recently, the proportion of women in senior executive
committees or boards in China has reached 11%, much
higher than the 3% recorded in Japan or South Korea
(Chen, 2019). According to Chen (2019), 35% of manage-
ment positions in China were held by women in 2018,
while the average in the European continent was 30%.
While the percentage of female directors and executives
in firms has risen rapidly in recent years, this proportion
of female participation in firms is still not a considerable
figure. If the association of female directors and execu-
tives with the level of earnings management is success-
fully determined, it will add more evidence to help the
corporations to realize the important role of female top-
level leadership, including female directors and supervi-
sors on boards as well as executives. Moreover, public are
paying more attention to firms with increasing female
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participation. Many of the researchers have explored the
extent to which female directors and executives might bene-
fit or improve the value of firms. A growing number of
researchers believe that female executives and increased
female participation on boards can help to kerb earnings
management and increase the quality of financial reports.
In particular, previous studies concluded that female direc-
tors and females within senior management roles are help-
ful to improve the quality of financial reporting, such as less
earnings management (Adams & Ferreira, 2007;
Alqatan, 2019; Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007). For
instance, Adams and Ferreira (2007) found that gender
diversity on management boards helps to increase board
attendance for male and female directors and improve
accountability for managers' poor performance. Hillman
et al. (2007) indicated that female participation in the board
brings different experiences and enriches board communi-
cation, thereby improving the quality of board decisions.
According to Alqatan (2019), the earnings management of
firms with greater gender diversity becomes more effective
because gender-equal corporate management teams are
more conservative and cautious about spending and other
forms of management. However, the impact of gender
diversity in the management boards and executives with
regard to the quality of earnings management is inconclu-
sive. Some studies fail to prove the relationship of gender
diversity on boards and within executive roles to earnings
management (Kuo, Ning, & Song, 2014; Joecks, Pull, &
Vetter, 2013; Hili & Affes, 2012; Peni & Vahaamaa, 2010).
More specifically, Joecks et al. (2013) argued that the rela-
tively low proportion of women's participation on boards is
unlikely to have an influence on earnings manipulation.
In addition, the agency problem in reality prompts
managers to use flexible accounting policies to manipulate
financial statements (Man, Locke, & Wellalage, 2018),
which may impair the interests of shareholders. The incor-
rect reporting of numbers in financial statements would
impair the confidence of investors and misguide them,
causing them to be unwilling to invest in stock markets
and damage the economy (Arioglu, 2019). Earnings man-
agement is divided by two main kinds of strategies: the
accrual-based earnings management and real earnings
management (Luo, Xiang, & Huang, 2017; Sun, Lan, &
Liu, 2014). The accrual-based earnings management is to
increase or decrease reported income temporarily
according to the accounting principles (Zhu & Tian, 2009),
while manipulations to actual activity are usually man-
aged by altering the timing and scale of sales, investments
or financing transactions (Luo et al., 2017). A number of
studies have suggested that firms are more likely to manip-
ulate earnings by real activities as the methods of real
activity manipulations are harder to detect and constrain
(Cohen, Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Ge & Kim, 2014). For
instance, Chinese firms are more likely to use real activity
manipulations (Kuo et al., 2014; Talbi, Omri, Guesmi, &
Ftiti, 2015). China is now an emerging economy and the
largest recipient of foreign direct investment among devel-
oping countries (Man et al., 2018). Also, the institution of
real earnings management in China is not perfect and the
management cost is relatively low, therefore managers
tend to choose real earnings management (Kuo et al.,
2014). For these reasons, female participation on boards
and executives may play an important role in restraining
real earnings management as compared with accrual-
based earnings management in Chinese firms.
Furthermore, the extent of firms' earnings management
and the policies they employ are different in different
periods, for instance, in the bull or bear period. When firms
are in a downtime, management may increase revenue and
avoid losses to manipulate earnings (Habib, Bhuiyan, &
Islam, 2013). For example, in the 2008 financial global cri-
sis, stock return decreased due to inflation and the sub-
prime mortgage crisis, which significantly impacted the
earnings management behaviours (Kumar & Vij, 2017).
According to Jahmani, Niranjan, and Toney (2016), firms
are more likely to engage in earnings management during
a recession period, aiming to avoid the reporting of losses
and declined earnings. However, Kumar and Vij (2017)
hold the contrary opinion that the extent of earnings man-
agement is relatively low during the crisis period compared
to the bullish period. When firms experienced bull periods,
Kumar and Vij (2017) suggested that the level of earnings
manipulation in a good economic condition is relatively
high, while the Cimini (2015) argued that the extent of
earnings management declined after the financial global
crisis in 2008. Based on the above views, the policy and the
degree of earnings management are different in diverse
contexts, and the effect of gender diversity on boards and
within executive roles in firms may also impact differently
in different time periods.
Accordingly, the research into the effect of gender-
balance on boards and executives of firms on real earn-
ings management during bearish and bullish periods may
prove interesting. There are many studies about the asso-
ciation of gender diversity on boards and executive and
earnings management (Adams & Ferreira, 2007;
Alqatan, 2019; Davies, 2011; Hillman et al., 2007). Also,
many scholars contributed to research on the level of
earnings management under good or bad economic con-
ditions (Cimini, 2015; Demirkan & Platt, 2009; Habib
et al., 2013; Jahmani et al., 2016; Kumar & Vij, 2017).
However, the studies related with earnings management
to gender diversity on boards and executive during the
bear and bull periods have limited scope in the literature.
In consideration of this knowledge gap, this study
explored the relationship of gender diversity on boards
and in executive roles to real earnings management and
any potential differences in the relationship during
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bearish and bullish periods. In order to achieve this, the
real earnings management model was chosen to test the
level of earnings management on the basis that it is more
appropriate for the Chinese context (Kuo et al., 2014;
Talbi et al., 2015). The independent and control variables
were boards and executives. The independent variables
included directors, independent directors, boards' supervi-
sors, CEOs and CFOs and these were selected because these
factors significantly impacted on earnings management in
previous literature (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Gavious,
Segev, & Yosef, 2012; Gul, Fung, & Jaggi, 2009; Hillman
et al., 2007). Control variables included board size, firm size,
return on assets, return on equity, debt leverage, book-to-
market ratio, sales growth, firm loss and Big4 external
auditors, for which there was a high correlation with earn-
ings manipulations (Arioglu, 2019; Arun, Almahrog, &
Aribi, 2015; Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2008; Rahman &
Ali, 2006; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990; Wei & Xie, 2015; Yu,
Du, & Sun, 2006).
The novel contribution of our research considers the
following aspects: female supervisors on boards and execu-
tives are correlated with degree of real earnings manage-
ment both in bear and bull periods. Our paper also
highlighted that the choices made by CEOs and CFOs in
earnings management during bullish and bearish periods
are different. Moreover, key evidence to support the impor-
tant role of female top leadership and may encourage com-
panies to improve the proportion of female directors and
executives, and therefore make full use of the role of
females on firms' boards and executives. Lastly, female
directors and independent directors are not related to real
earnings management in both periods. This study contrib-
utes to the literature by considering the impact of gender
diversity of boards (management boards and supervisory
boards) and executives on real earnings management dur-
ing bear and bull periods. The remainder of this paper is
designed as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relevant lit-
erature about real earnings management; Section 3 pre-
sents a detailed methodology and sample selection,
Section 4 tests the hypotheses developed based on the
research findings and comprehensively explains the empir-
ical results derived by all models. Section 5 concludes and
summarizes the full study.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 | Real earnings management in bull
or bear market
2.1.1 | Real earnings management
Healy and Wahlen (1999) pointed out that managers used
their own judgement to change financial reports and
structured transactions when managing earnings, so that
stakeholders could misunderstand the company's basic
economic performance. Accrual-based earnings manage-
ment and real earnings management are two main strate-
gies for earnings manipulations (Cohen et al., 2008; Luo
et al., 2017). Managers control accrual accounting
methods or participate in real activity management to
adjust earnings, misleading stakeholders about the comp-
any's potential economic performance (Sun et al., 2014).
With regard to accrual-based earnings management, a
large amount of existing literature uses the discretionary
accrual as the determinant to it (Ghazali, Shafie, & Sanusi,
2015; Mohanram, 2003; Wei & Xie, 2015). Mohanram (2003)
suggested that corporates with positive discretionary
accruals are likely to up earnings manipulation, while cor-
porates with negative discretionary accruals are likely to
down earnings manipulation. Moreover, a few researchers
pointed out that earnings management based on accrual
is difficult to be recognized and scrutinized by non-
professional outsiders as long as following allowable
accounting and estimation methods to manage earnings
(Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005).
This is, therefore, a popular way to manage earnings.
However, some existing literature has argued that real
earnings management is a more practical way to examine
whether firms manipulate earnings. Since firms tend to
choose the methods of real activity manipulations, those
are harder to detect and constrain (Cohen et al., 2008; Ge &
Kim, 2014; Kuo et al., 2014). In the results of Cohen
et al. (2008), firms within their sample were exercising the
real earnings management rather than accrual-based earn-
ings management, since the corporate governance and
ethics rules in firms are not enough to limit the use of real
activities manipulations, while accrual earnings manage-
ment is easier to be managed. Kuo et al. (2014) also
reported that, after the split-share reform in China, Chinese
enterprises switched to real earnings management from
accrual manipulation because the possibility of real activity
manipulations being discovered could be ignored. For
instance, the use of real activity in earnings management
occurs when firms breach the debt contract (Kim, Lisic, &
Pevzner, 2010) and issue their new bond (Ge & Kim, 2014)
to mislead rating agencies, causing bond yield spreads to
fall. Furthermore, Roychowdhury (2006) detected real earn-
ings management through three methods, including sales
acceleration, overproduction and discretionary expense
decrease. The first method was to smooth the earnings
management of current profits by accelerating sales or
changing sales time. When managers expect that the
current operating results are not satisfactory or cannot
meet expectations, managers usually have the incentive to
attract customers by providing sales discounts or relaxing
credit policies, temporarily increasing the sales volume
of enterprises and accelerating revenue (Sun et al., 2014).
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Similarly, when managers believe that it is necessary to
smooth the operating profit of the company, they will
delay the sales time to adjust the sales income in different
periods to achieve the purpose of earnings control
(Dechow & Skinner, 2000). Secondly, it is also possible to
increase the operating profit by increasing the output to
reduce the cost per unit of product, reducing the produc-
tion cost of the sold product (Sun et al., 2014). Thirdly, it is
possible to increase or decrease discretionary expenditures.
Discretionary expenditures refer to that expense that can
be determined by management, such as research and
development expenses, publicity fees and employee train-
ing fees (Wei & Xie, 2015). These expenses are usually
future-oriented and have little impact on the company's
current production activities. Discretionary fees can easily
become a mean for managers to control their earnings.
Therefore, real earnings management is more suitable to
this research based on Chinese background.
2.1.2 | The bull or bear market
Bull and bear markets are representative of cycles in stock
prices. Previous studies such as Chauvet and Potter (2000)
as well as Cheng, Lee, and Lin (2013) defined the bull or
bear market where stock prices experience up or down
movements in continuous periods. Specifically, Cheng
et al. (2013) took the Taiwan stock market as an example
to identify the bull (bear) market by examining three con-
secutive months of upward (downward) trend of stock
return in the market. There are two main measurements,
including the Markov-switching model and BB algorithm
(Bry & Boschan, 1971). The Markov-switching model was
implemented by Girardin and Liu (2003) as well as Chi,
Brooks, Bheenick, and Tang (2016) in order to examine the
movement of the stock market. Girardin and Liu (2003)
used the Markov-switching model to study the changes in
China's Shanghai A-share market from 1995 to 2002. They
found that, on the whole, the bear and bull periods of the
Chinese stock market were very short due to speculative
investors. Chi et al. (2016) also tested the Chinese bull and
bear market using the Markov-switching model, and found
that the significant overlap in the bear market helps to
explain the long cycle of the bear market in China. How-
ever, Yan, Powell, Shi, and Xu (2007), who distinguished
the market trend cycles in Chinese stock market during
1991–2006 by BB algorithm, argued that the BB algorithm
(Bry & Boschan, 1971), compared with the Markov-
switching model, is much closer to the standard perception
of bull and bear cycles. Also, according to the opinion of
Canova (1998), who utilized the BB algorithm, the period
of rising or falling stock prices must last for 12 months to
be recognized as a bear market or a bull market.
In the bullish period, the economic environment is
one of prosperity, and pressure on the institutional inves-
tors' own earnings is relatively low, thus the tendency of
pressure on listed companies' management to manage
earnings is relatively low (Jahmani et al., 2016). More-
over, Cimini (2015) suggested that the extent of earnings
management declined after the financial global crisis in
2008. Nevertheless, firms in bullish may also be more
likely to manage earnings by expanding equity invest-
ment. Kumar and Vij (2017) suggested that firms are
more likely to engage in earnings management during
pre-crisis and post-crisis times, which means that there is
a high level of earnings manipulation in good economic
conditions. In the bearish period, institutional investors
and listed company managers need to attract investors'
attention through earnings management and, therefore,
the tendency of institutional investors to promote earn-
ings is more obvious (Jahmani et al., 2016). For instance,
Habib et al. (2013) proposed that corporate managers
may use this opportunity to manipulate returns by choos-
ing different accounting methods, such as increasing
profits and avoiding losses when they encounter financial
crises. However, Demirkan and Platt (2009) held the
opposite view, that companies that are already in trouble
reduce earnings management because they run out of
earnings management tools before they get into trouble.
Also, when the bearish period arrives, the public are
more tolerant to the lower earnings reported by firms
because almost all firms underperform in their financial
reports during that downtime (Ahmad, Campbell, &
Goodacre, 2011). Therefore, there are many different pat-
terns of decisions and activities by corporate manage-
ment to manipulate earnings in bull or bear markets.
2.2 | Gender diversity on boards and in
the roles of executives
2.2.1 | Gender diversity on boards
The correlation between the quality of earnings manage-
ment and board members, researchers also explored the
relationship between the gender diversity of board composi-
tion and the influence of earnings management level. How-
ever, the results of these prior studies are inconclusive.
Some studies did find that gender diversity in the board-
room helps improve the quality of earnings management,
as gender diversity on boards may lead to the broadest pool
of talent as well as the better and more responsible corpo-
rate governance (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Davies, 2011;
Hillman et al., 2007). On the contrary, some studies in this
field have shown that the correlation between board gender
diversity and earnings management has not been proved
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successful in the research process (Carter, Souza, Simkins, &
Simpson, 2010; Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski, &
Atkins, 2009).
A more gender-diversified boardroom provides a better
supervisory role and an adequate number of female direc-
tors can form an effective supervisory management struc-
ture in firms (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Hillman
et al., 2007). Adams and Ferreira (2007) stated that gender-
balanced boards can effectively increase the attendance of
both male and female directors. Women's participation on
the board brings different experiences and enriches board
communication, thereby improving the quality of board
decisions and effectiveness of monitoring (Hillman
et al., 2007). Moreover, women are often good at collecting
personal information, to reduce the information asymme-
try between female directors and managers. On the other
hand, women are more conservative and less aggressive
than men. They tend to be more willing to disclose specific
information (Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011). Therefore, a high
proportion of female directors on management boards may
help to kerb managers' manipulations and increase the
quality of earnings management, thereby being seen to be
more friendly to other stakeholders.
Furthermore, diversification enhances independence
and promotes procedural justice to ensure the best inter-
ests of shareholders and stakeholders (Carter, Simkins, &
Simpson, 2003; Temile, Jatmiko, & Hidayat, 2018). Com-
panies with a high percentage of independent directors
can effectively constrain management's opportunistic
behaviour and enhance the effectiveness of board control
(Talbi et al., 2015). Moreover, in Chinese firms' boards,
more female independent directors were required from
2002, as set out by China Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion (CSRC). Thus, the female independent directors
probably also affect the earnings management.
Some studies have failed to find any relationship
between gender diversity on boards with earnings man-
agement (Hili & Affes, 2012; Joecks et al., 2013; Kuo
et al., 2014). For instance, Hili and Affes (2012) found that
earnings management has nothing to do with women's
participation in the board. Moreover, if female participa-
tion in boards is relatively low, it is unlikely to have a
major impact on corporate decisions (Joecks et al., 2013).
Moreover, some Chinese companies show that the inci-
dence of earnings management is still relatively high, so
that the female directors suppressing earnings manage-
ment effects is not obvious. It may be because the demand
for high-quality earnings management and the litigation
risk of earnings management is relatively low, so that
manipulating earnings of companies in China is not a dif-
ficult thing (Kuo et al., 2014; Liu & Tian, 2012). Therefore,
the economic impact of board gender diversity on earnings
management remains a controversial topic.
2.2.2 | Gender diversity in the roles of
executives
Executives are more likely to engage in earnings manipu-
lations by exploiting flexibility accounting policies for
resolving agency problems (Man et al., 2018). If there is
gender diversity on management, earnings management
will become more effective because gender-equal corpo-
rate management teams are more conservative and cau-
tious about spending and other forms of management
(Alqatan, 2019). Female executives, especially CEOs and
CFOs, may also influence the quality of earnings manage-
ment due to their involvement in financial reporting pro-
cesses and accounting decisions (Francis, Hasan, Park, &
Wu, 2015). Francis et al. (2015) proposed that female
CEOs and CFOs tend to be more cautious and risk-averse
than men due to conservative nature of females in finan-
cial disclosure. Similarly, Gavious et al. (2012) found that
the level of earnings management with female CEOs is
lower than that of companies with male CEOs, and there
is a negative correlation between female executives and
the degree of earnings management. Gul et al. (2009) also
reported that female CFOs play an important role in the
company because their primary responsibility is financial
reporting, and they tend to use more conservative
reporting and corporate strategies than male CFOs. How-
ever, Peni and Vahaamaa (2010) found no association of
CEOs gender and earnings management. Therefore,
whether gender diversity in CEO and CFO roles contrib-
ute to better management in earnings is still not clear.
2.2.3 | Gender diversity on board of
supervisors
According to company law in China, a company must
have a board of supervisors and no less than three mem-
bers. Directors and senior management must not serve as
supervisors. Panzer and Muller (2015) stated that firms
with female supervisors on board are more conservative
in the choice of financial reporting policy and standard.
Therefore, the supervisory board may limit senior man-
agement to manage earnings. Also, since there is little
known in terms of the relation of female supervisors on
boards and real earnings management, their relationship
is worth examining within the scope of this study.
2.3 | Hypotheses development
Firstly, previous studies reveal that gender diversity on
the management board, executive roles and supervisory
boards is likely to affect the quality of earnings
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management, and female directors, executives and super-
visors may play an important role to constrain earnings
management (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Davies, 2011;
Francis et al., 2015; Hillman et al., 2007).
Secondly, previous studies found that real earnings
management is more practical in underperforming firms
(Cohen et al., 2008; Kuo et al., 2014) and standard models
for discretionary accruals may not be reliable when
applied to companies with extreme performance (Dechow,
Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). Furthermore, in China, the firm
tends to manage earnings by real activity, because it is har-
der to detect than accrual earnings management (Kuo
et al., 2014). Thus, real earnings management is a more
practical index as a dependent variable to examine the
hypotheses in this study.
Thirdly, the methods and decisions of firms in earnings
management are different in different time periods, such
as bull or bear period. And the effects of female participa-
tion on boards and executives on real earnings manage-
ment are also different in bullish and bearish periods.
When firms are in recession conditions, managers may
increase revenue and avoid losses to manipulate earnings
(Habib et al., 2013), but Kumar and Vij (2017) reported
that the extent of earnings management is relatively low
during the crisis period than bullish period. When firms
are in the bull period, the level of earnings manipulation
is relatively high (Kumar & Vij, 2017), but Cimini (2015)
argued that the extent of earnings management would
decline in this period. Plus, managers choose appropriate
strategies and decisions under the supervision of the board
of management (Sun et al., 2014; Talbi et al., 2015). Thus,
the impact of gender diversity on boards and executives in
bear market or bull market on real earnings management
is likely to prove significant research.
Overall, this study will predict that the association of
gender diversity on the board of management (indepen-
dent directors and directors), executives (senior manage-
ment, CEOs and CFOs) and supervisors of boards to real
earnings management during bull (bear) period are
highly correlated. Accordingly, the hypotheses are formu-
lated as follows:
H1. The proportion of female directors on boards and real
earnings management during bull or bear market
are significantly correlated.
H2. . The proportion of female independent directors on
boards and real earnings management during bull
or bear market are significantly correlated.
H3. The proportion of female executives and real earnings
management during bull or bear market are signifi-
cantly correlated.
H4. The proportion of female CEOs and real earnings
management during bull or bear market are signifi-
cantly correlated.
H5. The proportion of CFOs and real earnings manage-
ment during bull or bear market are significantly
correlated.
H6. The proportion of supervisors on boards and real
earnings management during bull or bear market
are significantly correlated.
3 | METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Data and data sources
The main purpose of this study is to examine the
impact of boards' gender diversity and executives on
real earnings management in bull and bear market. To
address it, all variables in the data in the Chinese listed
firms of A-share of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges for the period 2000–2017 were calculated.
The data were obtained from the China Stock Market
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Firms
that experienced losses and belonged to ST1 (special
treatment) or financial industry2 were eliminated.
Accordingly, the data sample selected was a total of
26,052 firm-year observations including 2,891 unique
firms after dropping the missing and duplicate values.
The sample was separated by the bullish (11,616 firm-
year observations) and bearish (14,436 firm-year obser-
vations) period and the distribution of this is set out in
Table 1, which shows that most of the industries are
manufacturing.
3.2 | Dependent variables
Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008) identified
three determinants of real earnings management, includ-
ing sales acceleration, discretionary expenditure (DE) and
overproduction (OP). Thus, OCF, DE and OP, as real activ-
ity manipulation, are estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions for each year, respectively, and formu-
lated as follows:
OCF=Ai, t−1 = β0 + β1 1=Ai, t−1ð Þ+ β2 Si, t=Ai, t−1ð Þ
+ β3 4Si, t=Ai, t−1ð Þ+ εt,
ð1Þ
DE=Ai,t−1 = β0 + β1 1=Ai,t−1ð Þ+ β2 Si,t=Ai,t−1ð Þ+ εt and,
ð2Þ
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OP=Ai, t−1 = β0 + β1 1=Ai, t−1ð Þ+ β2 Si, t=Ai, t−1ð Þ
+ β3 4Si, t=Ai, t−1ð Þ+ β4 4Si, t−1=Ai, t−1ð Þ
+ εt,Model
ð3Þ
where i is firm; t is year; OCF is operating cashflow; DE is
the sum of sales expenses and administrative expenses; OP
is the sum of the cost of goods sold (COGS) and inventory
variation (Δ INVT); A is total assets; S is net sales.
According to Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen
et al. (2008), real earnings management (REM) is the
sum of three standardized residuals calculated from three
separate regression models (model 1, model 2 and model
3). AB_OCF, AB_DE and AB_OP will represent three
results of standardized residuals of model 1, model 2 and
model 3, respectively. The level of REM depends on the
results of calculation in regression models as below:
REM=AB_OP –AB_OCF –AB_DE, ð4Þ
where AB_OCF is abnormal level of operating cash flow
(the residual of model 1); AB_OP is abnormal level of
production (the residual of model 2); AB_DE is abnormal
level of discretionary expenses (the residual of model 3).
3.3 | Independent variables
According to previous studies (Adams & Ferreira, 2007;
Davies, 2011; Francis et al., 2015; Hillman et al., 2007)
and hypotheses of this study, the proportions of female
directors (PFD), independent female directors (PFID),
female executives (PFE) and female supervisors on
boards (PFSP) are independent variables. The female
CEOs (ISCEO) and CFOs (ISCFO) act as dummy vari-
ables, using code 1 to represent female CEOs and CFOs
in firm, and 0 otherwise. These variables, during the bull-
ish and bearish periods, are used to measure the effect of
female participation of boards and executives on REM in
this study.
3.4 | Control variables
There are various firms-specific characteristics as control
variables to predict the REM. Size is included in the
regression, which helps to control the potential impact of
firm size and board size on the REM. Xie, Davidson III,
and DaDalt (2003) and Rahman and Ali (2006) imposed
board size (BS) to examine the potential effects on earn-
ings management, which is calculated by total number of
directors on a board. The size of the board of directors
maybe positively or negatively correlated to earnings
management. Smaller boards may be more functional
and more accountable for financial reporting. Directors
of larger boards are likely to be experienced in financial
reporting, raising the possibility of profit management
prevention (Xie et al., 2003). It is also stated by Fama
and Jensen (1983) that boards with the optimal size
are more likely to make internal communication and
TABLE 1 Sample distribution by year and industry
Panel A: Sample distribution by year and industry during bullish periods (see the completed Table A1 in Appendix)
Industry
Year
Code 2000 2005 2006 2007 2017 Total
Agricultural 1 13 27 … 29 40 252
Mining 2 9 19 … 22 39 223
Manufacturing 3 462 712 … 715 1,502 7,752
… … … … … … … …
Total 755 1,116 1,097 1,123 2,051 11,616
Panel B: Sample distribution by year and industry during bearish periods (see the completed Table A2 in Appendix)
Year
Industry Code 2001 2002 … 2014 2016 Total
Agricultural 1 18 20 … 42 39 303
Mining 2 12 15 … 43 37 279
Manufacturing 3 552 598 … 1,370 1,418 9,524
… … … … … … … …
Total 884 955 … 2,036 1,937 14,436
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decision-making easier. Firm size (FS) is considered as one
of the influences on earnings management, which is mea-
sured by the number of employees. Cornett et al. (2008)
argued that firms with a larger size tend to manipulate earn-
ings as the market pressure is greater for big-sized firms.
ROA is a determinant for firm profitability, which
can be calculated by return divided by total asset. Watts
and Zimmerman (1990) reported that firms with a higher
performance of profitability are more likely to manage
earnings downwards. Return on equity (ROE) is related
to earnings management in Chinese listed firms that can
be a control variable as highlighted in Yu et al.'s (2006)
previous study, where they suggested that Chinese listed
firms are more likely to manage earnings for meeting the
ROE requirement. ROE is the ratio of return to equity.
LEV is a ratio of total liabilities to total assets used as a
proxy for debt covenant violation, which has two oppo-
site conclusions on relationship with earnings manage-
ment. That is, LEV is negatively or positively related to
earnings management (Arun et al., 2015).
Book-to-market (BM) ratio is negatively correlated to
earnings management, while sales growth (SALES) is
positively associated with earnings management (Butler,
Leone, & Willenborg, 2004; Wei & Xie, 2015). Firm loss
(LOSS) represents the poor financial condition of the firm
and is often employed in studies to test the impact on
earnings management (Arun et al., 2015; Luo
et al., 2017). A poor financial condition may incentivize
the earnings management for increasing income (Jaggi &
Lee, 2002). Thus, BM, SALES and LOSS will be control
variables. LOSS uses code1 to represent the negative net
income and 0 otherwise.
External auditor (Big 4), as independent audit compa-
nies, is more able to constrain earnings management
compared to non-Big four independent audit companies
because they are more concerned about reputation issues
(Arioglu, 2019; Francis & Wang, 2008). Because indepen-
dent auditing is fairly new in China, the quality of
auditing in China maybe more variable and harder to be
measured, and this is likely to contribute to explaining
the incidence of fraud (Zhu & Tian, 2009). Thus, Big 4 as
a variable is designated code 1 for that a firm is audited
by Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Finally, the industry
and year indicators are used to control the effects of
industry and year because the degree of regression results
tends to be different over time and across industries. All
defined variables including dependent, independent and
control variables are listed in Table 2.
3.5 | Model of the impact of gender
diversity on boards and executives on real
earnings management
Hypotheses were tested by the OLS regression model and
the heteroscedasticity adjusted in this study. When the value
of variance inflation factor (VIF) is below 10, the multi-
collinearity can be avoided effectively (Gujarati, 2003). The
outlier is dropped in the regression model to avoid the bias
of results. The model equation is formulated as below:





The sum of the three standardized
residuals of AB_OCF, AB_OP and
AB_DE, in which AB_OCF is
abnormal level of operating cash flow
measured from model 1; AB_OP is
abnormal level of overproduction
measured from model 2; AB_DE is
abnormal level of discretionary
expenses measured from model 3
Independent variables
PFID The proportion of female independent directors in
each sample firms
PFD The proportion of female directors in each sample
firms
PFSP The proportion of board of female supervisors in each
sample firms
PFE The proportion of female executives in each sample
firms
ISCEO Code 1 is designated that CEOs in firms are female,
and 0 otherwise.
ISCFO Code 1 is designated that CFOs in firms are female,
and 0 otherwise.
Control variables
Board size (BS) The total number of directors on a board
Firm size (FS) The total number of employees in firms
ROA The ratio of return to total assets
ROE The ratio of return to equity
LEV The ratio of total liabilities to total assets
Book-to-market
(BM) ratio
The ratio of stock price to book value per
share at the end of the year
SALES The sales growth rate for year t-1 to t
LOSS (dum1) Code 1 indicates when the firms have a
negative net income, and 0 otherwise
BIG4 (dum2) Code 1 indicates when the firms' external
auditor belongs to Big 4 auditors, that is,
Deloitte, PWC, EY and KPMG, and 0
otherwise
Industry/year Each variable correspond to an industry
and year that are controlled in regression
analysis
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REMi, t = β0 + β1 PFDð Þ+ β2 PFIDð Þ+ β3 PFEð Þ
+ β4 ISCEOð Þ+ β5 ISCFOð Þ+ β6 PFSPð Þ
+ β7 BSð Þ+ β8 FSð Þ+ β9 ROAð Þ+ β10 ROEð Þ
+ β11 LEVð Þ+ β12 SALESð Þ+ β13 MBð Þ
+ β14 LOSSð Þ+ β15 BIG4ð Þ+ εi, t:
ð5Þ
3.6 | The bull and bear period
Compared with the Markov-switching model, Bry and
Boschan are much closer to standard in the judgement of
the bull and the bear market time periods (Yan
et al., 2007). The BB algorithm model (1971) suggested
that the bull (bear) market period is represented by stock
prices rising (falling) for 12 months consecutively. On the
other hand, all variables are picked from annual financial
statements so that the bull or bear period should last at
least 1 year. Accordingly, the bull market or bear market
period, in this study, will be represented by the period of
annual increase or decrease in stock prices. The overall
index level of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share and the
bull (bear) period distribution are introduced in Table 3.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Descriptive statistics
As can be seen in Table 4, the number of observations is
11,616 and 14,436 in bull market periods and bear market
periods separately. The mean value of REM in the bull
period is positive, at 0.002, while in bear periods indicates
a negative mean value, at −0.017. The result suggests that
firms in China, on average, tend to be more conservative in
REM during bear market periods or prefer to manipulate
the sales, discretionary expenses and overproduction dur-
ing bull periods, which is similar to Ghazali et al. (2015)
who suggest that financial distress and earnings manage-
ment are negatively related. It may mean that firms in dan-
gerous conditions, such as the bear market condition, may
not be able to manage earnings successfully.
The average ratio of female directors to total directors
on boards (PFD) is 12.1% and 11.7% during the bear and
bull periods respectively, which is slightly higher than
10.2% as reported by the study of Luo et al. (2017) for a
Chinese sample. The mean value of the proportion of
female independent directors (PFID) and female execu-
tives (PFE) is around 14% in two kinds of periods and the
max value is 100%, which illustrates that all of the inde-
pendent directors on boards or executives of some Chi-
nese firms are women. These findings indicate that
China has made a great change in increasing female par-
ticipation on boards. Similarly, the mean proportion of
female supervisors (PFSP) is higher than the proportion
of female directors and executives, at around 23.5% dur-
ing the two periods.
The mean ROE and sales growth (SALES) have a big
differential between the bull and bear period. The aver-
age ratio of ROE is 4.5% in the bull period while that in
the bear period is 2.4%. The average rate of SALES is
2.377 in the bull period while that in the bear period is
0.348. This result shows that the financial condition
in bullish time is much better than that in bearish time.
In addition, few firms use Big4 auditor, at around 1.6% in
the two periods. Finally, the mean values of other control
variables are similar in bullish and bearish periods.
4.2 | Correlation matrix
The correlation coefficients of all variables of the study
are displayed in Table 5. Almost all of the independent
variables (PFD, PFSP, PFE, ISCEO, ISCFO and PFSP) are
correlated at 1% significance level. As expected, PFE and
PFSP are correlated with REM at 3.8% (at 1% significance
level) and 2.4% (at 5% significance level), respectively, in
bullish periods, while that in bearish periods is 3.0%
(at 5% significance level) and 2.3% (at 1% significance
level). This finding supports Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis
6 that female executives and supervisors are able to kerb
real earnings management.
Gujarati (2003) argued that ±80% of the coefficients
are suspected of multi-collinearity problems, which are
TABLE 3 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share index level from
2000 to 2017
Bullish year: 2000, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2017
Bearish year: 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2009,2011, 2013,
2014, 2016
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detrimental to the results of regression analysis. Table 5
shows that the highest correlation coefficient of 64.9%
exists in the relationship between the PFD and PFID dur-
ing the bullish and bearish periods, showing a 1% signifi-
cance level. Therefore, there is no multi-collinearity
between independent variables.
4.3 | Regression results
Table 6 presents the estimation of the results of the bull-
ish and bearish periods through the pooled OLS regres-
sion model. The results in both the bullish and bearish
periods as set out in Table 6 suggest that the coefficients
of PFE and PFSP are negatively significant at 1% related
to REM. These results imply that firms with female exec-
utives and female board supervisors are better to kerb the
manipulation of actual activities in both periods, which is
consistent with reports of Alqatan (2019) as well as Pan-
zer and Muller (2015). Thus, Hypothesis 3 and Hypothe-
sis 6 are supported.
Moreover, the coefficient of ISCEO is positively asso-
ciated to REM with 5% significance during bullish time.
This result suggests female CEOs are more likely to
manipulate the earnings management during the bullish
time, perhaps because CEOs are not willing to give up
the chance of raising money in this kind of prosperous
economic environment. In the bearish time, the relation-
ship of ISCEO with REM is positive but not significant,
which means that the probability of female CEOs manip-
ulating earnings declined in a downtime due to the char-
acteristic of conservative. In other words, female CEOs
limit earnings manipulation during bearish periods com-
pared with that in bullish periods, supporting Hypothe-
sis 4.
In addition, the association of ISCFO with REM is
positive but insignificant during bullish time, while that
in bearish time is positively significant at 10%. This
implies that female CFOs are more likely to manage real
earnings in bearish time than in bullish time. It may be
because female CFOs are more sensitive to the depressed
economic environment and are not willing to tolerate
loss in the bearish period. Therefore, female CFOs kerb
REM in bullish time compared to that in bearish time,
supporting Hypothesis 5.
It is known that executives in firms are including
CEOs, CFOs and other managers so that the relationships
between REM with female executives, CEOs and CFOs are
more likely to be similar. However, an interesting result is
shown in Table 6, which suggests that the PFE (the
TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics
Bull periods Bear periods
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max
REM 11,616 0.002 0.216 −1.231 1.283 14,436 −0.017 0.233 −2.031 2.266
PFD 11,616 0.121 0.114 0 0.714 14,436 0.117 0.113 0 0.833
PFID 11,616 0.140 0.191 0 1 14,436 0.134 0.189 0 1
PFE 11,616 0.140 0.154 0 1 14,436 0.136 0.151 0 1
ISCEO 11,616 0.087 0.281 0 1 14,436 0.088 0.284 0 1
ISCFO 11,616 0.277 0.448 0 1 14,436 0.270 0.444 0 1
PFSP 11,616 0.237 0.285 0 1 14,436 0.233 0.278 0 1
BS 11,616 9.921 2.432 4 25 14,436 10.09 2.524 4 26
FS 11,616 5,031 16,094 7 552,698 14,436 4,891 15,541 11 477,780
ROA 11,616 0.036 0.061 −0.628 0.762 14,436 0.033 0.082 −2.746 4.837
ROE 11,616 0.045 0.339 −16.72 2.776 14,436 0.024 0.718 −30.66 14.78
LEV 11,616 0.422 0.208 0 0.994 14,436 0.425 0.208 0 0.997
SALES 11,616 2.377 112.4 −4.411 10,026 14,436 0.348 3.683 −6.077 215.7
MB 11,616 4.530 7.479 0.206 322.5 14,436 4.193 13.94 0.152 941.0
LOSS 11,616 0.114 0.318 0 1 14,436 0.116 0.321 0 1
BIG4 11,616 0.016 0.126 0 1 14,436 0.019 0.136 0 1
Abbreviations: BIG4, coded 1 if firm is audited by Big4 auditing firms, and 0 otherwise; BS, board size; FS, firm size; ISCEO, coded 1 if CEO in the firm is
female, and 0 otherwise; ISCFO, coded 1 if CFO in firm is female; LEV, financial leverage; LOSS, coded 1 if firm has loss, and 0 otherwise; MB, market-to-book
ratio; PFD, proportion of female directors on boards; PFE, proportion of female executives; PFID, proportion of female independent directors on boards; PFSP,
proportion of female supervisors on boards; REM, real earnings management; ROA, return on assets; ROE, return on equity; SALES, growing sales.
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TABLE 5 Correlation matrix
Panel A: Correlation matrix in bullish periods
REM PFD PFID PFFM ISCEO ISCFO PFSP BS
REM 1
PFD −0.006 1
PFID −0.002 0.649*** 1
PFE −0.038*** 0.330*** 0.040*** 1
ISCEO 0.0038 0.268*** 0.024*** 0.268*** 1
ISCFO −0.007 0.172*** 0.050*** 0.535*** 0.039*** 1
PFSP −0.024** 0.117*** 0.013 0.145*** 0.070*** 0.082*** 1
BS −0.003 −0.046*** −0.008 −0.068*** −0.033 −0.009 −0.033*** 1
FS −0.041*** −0.074*** −0.029*** −0.076*** −0.017* −0.037*** −0.060*** 0.113***
ROA −0.346*** 0.007 0.001 0.020** 0.016* 0.013 0.001 0.009
ROE −0.101*** −0.014 −0.020** 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.016* 0.019**
LEV 0.152*** −0.094*** −0.058*** −0.097*** −0.028*** −0.081*** −0.030*** 0.051***
SALES −0.011 0.010 0.001 −0.005 −0.003 −0.007 −0.006 0.012
MB −0.008 0.017* 0.010 0.012 −0.007 0.003 0.011 −0.037***
LOSS 0.157*** −0.008 0.008 −0.016* −0.014 0.002 −0.019** 0.012
BIG4 −0.024*** −0.066*** −0.049*** −0.046*** −0.035*** −0.030*** −0.027*** 0.080***
FS ROA ROE LEV SALES MB LOSS BIG4
FS 1
ROA 0.035*** 1
ROE 0.025*** 0.503*** 1
LEV 0.089*** −0.307*** −0.137*** 1
SALES 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.003 1
MB −0.059*** −0.021** −0.178*** 0.111*** −0.001 1
LOSS −0.025*** −0.591*** −0.345*** 0.143*** −0.008 0.081*** 1
BIG4 0.286*** 0.024*** 0.015 0.039*** −0.003 −0.022** −0.014 1
Panel B: Correlation matrix in bearish periods
REM PFD PFID PFFM ISCEO ISCFO PFSP BS
REM 1
PFD −0.004 1
PFID −0.006 0.630*** 1
PFE −0.030** 0.339*** 0.042*** 1
ISCEO 0.003 0.266*** 0.011 0.265*** 1
ISCFO −0.006 0.179*** 0.053*** 0.528*** 0.038*** 1
PFSP −0.023*** 0.111*** 0.004 0.158*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 1
BS −0.007 −0.048*** −0.012 −0.057*** −0.030*** 0.002 −0.041*** 1
FS −0.055*** −0.074*** −0.030*** −0.076*** −0.022*** −0.029*** −0.061*** 0.108***
ROA −0.267*** 0.015 0.009*** 0.036 0.004 0.026*** 0.015* 0.009
ROE −0.060*** 0.004 −0.007 0.013 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.015*
LEV 0.144*** −0.084*** −0.051*** −0.097*** −0.025*** −0.086*** −0.030*** 0.061***
SALES −0.019** −0.003 −0.007 −0.005 0.010 −0.009 0.002 0.006
MB 0.020** 0.001 −0.004 0.009 −0.004 0.00720 −0.002 −0.024***
(Continues)
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proportion of executives) is negatively related to REM in
both periods, while the CEOs and CFOs are positively
related to REM in both periods. This differs from the expec-
tation. From the raw data in this paper, it is found that
female executives that exclude CEOs and CFOs also serve
as directors in firms. Although the mean proportion and
number of female executives who are also directors are rel-
atively low, it may still influence the regression results in
Table 6. The reason for the different relationships of REM
with female executives, CEOs and CFOs is perhaps that
non-CEOs and non-CFOs in female executives who are
also directors may help to kerb the real earnings manage-
ment in both periods. Female executives are not only CEOs
and CFOs, but also other managers. Other managers who
serve as directors may constrain the agency problems of
earnings management manipulated by CFOs and CEOs in
both periods. Therefore, it is reasonable that the relation of
REM to female executives is negative while the relation of
REM to CEOs and CFOs is positive.
However, the associations between female directors
and independent directors on the board with REM are
insignificant during both bullish and bearish times, as
shown in Table 6. This means that the directors and inde-
pendent directors on the board have no impact on real
activity manipulation in both periods. It may be because
the proportion of female directors is relatively low in Chi-
nese listed firms. According to Joecks et al. (2013), the
relatively low proportion of women's participation in the
board is unlikely to have an influence on earnings
manipulation. Thus, the low proportion is the main rea-
son that the effect of female participation on manage-
ment boards is not significant.
4.4 | Robustness checks
4.4.1 | Additional test for effect of the
number of independent variables
The robustness of the preliminary results is examined in
Table 7, changing the proportion of independent vari-
ables (PFD, PFID, PFE and PFSP) and dummy variables
(ISCEO and ISCFO) to the number of these variables
(NFD, NFID, NFE, NCEO, NCFO and NFSP).
The coefficients of NFE and NFSP are negatively cor-
related with REM at 1% significance level in both the
bullish and bearish periods, consistent with the pre-
regression results in Table 6, and also supporting Hypoth-
esis 3 and Hypothesis 6. Moreover, the correlation of
NCEO and NCFO with REM is all positive in both
periods, but the significance level of NCEO in the bullish
period and that of NCFO during the bearish period are
positively significant related to REM at 5% and 1%,
respectively. This finding is also consistent with previous
results and means that female CEOs are not more likely
to manipulate earnings in the bearish period and that
TABLE 5 (Continued)
Panel B: Correlation matrix in bearish periods
REM PFD PFID PFFM ISCEO ISCFO PFSP BS
LOSS 0.160*** −0.004 0.004 −0.022*** −0.004 −0.010 −0.022*** 0.023***
BIG4 −0.0142* −0.062*** −0.045*** −0.046*** −0.024*** −0.024*** −0.031*** 0.057***
FS ROA ROE LEV SALES MB dum1 dum2
FS 1
ROA 0.035*** 1
ROE 0.017* 0.453*** 1
LEV 0.096*** −0.259*** −0.129*** 1
SALES 0.008 0.0362*** 0.013 0.029*** 1
MB −0.034*** −0.042*** −0.218*** 0.111*** 0.004 1
LOSS −0.032*** −0.498*** −0.243*** 0.176*** −0.029*** 0.084*** 1
BIG4 0.246*** −0.001 0.005 0.037*** −0.006 −0.013 −0.006 1
Abbreviations: BIG4, coded 1 if firm is audited by Big4 auditing firms, and 0 otherwise; BS, board size; FS, firm size; ISCEO, coded 1 if CEO in the firm is
female, and 0 otherwise; ISCFO, coded 1 if CFO in firm is female; LEV, financial leverage; LOSS, coded 1 if firm has loss, and 0 otherwise; MB, market-to-book
ratio; PFD, proportion of female directors on boards; PFE, proportion of female executives; PFID, proportion of female independent directors on boards; PFSP,
proportion of female supervisors on boards; REM, real earnings management; ROA, return on assets; ROE, return on equity; SALES, growing sales.
*Correlation is significant at 10% level.
**Correlation is significant at the 5% level.
***Correlation is significant at the 1% level.
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female CFOs tend to be more conservative in REM in the
bullish period. This supports Hypothesis 4 and Hypothe-
sis 5. Furthermore, the correlation of REM with NFE and
the correlation of REM with NCEO and NCFO are also
opposite, consistent with the results of Table 6. In addi-
tion, the association of NFD with REM is still insignifi-
cant in both periods, which is consistent with the
pre-results. Although the relationship of NFID and REM
is negative significantly at a 5% level in the bearish time
period in Table 7, which is not consistent with the previ-
ous result of Table 6, the relation of NFID to REM is also
negative in Table 7. Overall, Table 7 shows that the main
findings in this paper are robust as it is consistent with
pre-regression results using the different measures of
females.
4.4.2 | Separate tests by the three
components of real earnings management
According to Roychowdhury (2006), sales alternation
(AB_OCF), overproduction (AB_OP) and discretionary
fees manipulation (AB_DE) are the three components of
REM. AB_OCF, AB_OP and AB_DE are the proxies of
REM, which are considered to be dependent variables in
the robustness check respectively. Specifically, the REM
is equal to AB_OP minus AB_OCF and AB_DE so that
the AB_OCF and AB_DE are inverse and reflect the
degree of REM. All values of AB_OCF and AB_DE
should multiply by −1. The results of an additional test
that uses three components of REM as an alternative
measure are presented in Table 8.
TABLE 6 Regression results for the relationship between the
proportion of female directors, executives and supervisors with real
earnings management during bullish and bearish periods
















Number of obs 11,616 14,436
Adjust R2 0.1501 0.1002
F 54.97 41.12
VIF 2.13 2.13
Abbreviations: BIG4, coded 1 if firm is audited by big4 auditing firms, and 0
otherwise; BS, board size; FS, firm size; ISCEO, coded 1 if CEO in the firm is
female, and 0 otherwise; ISCFO, coded 1 if CFO in firm is female; LEV,
financial leverage; LOSS, coded 1 if firm has loss, and 0 otherwise; MB,
market- to- book ratio; PFD, proportion of female directors on boards; PFE,
proportion of female executives; PFID, proportion of female independent
directors on boards; PFSP, proportion of female supervisors on boards; REM,
real earnings management; ROA, return on assets; ROE, return on equity;
SALES, growing sales.
*Correlation is significant at 10% level.
**Correlation is significant at the 5% level.
***Correlation is significant at the 1% level.
TABLE 7 The robust check result for the relationship between
the number of female directors, executives and supervisors with
real earnings management during bullish and bearish periods
















Number of obs 11,616 14,436
Adjust R2 0.151 0.100
F 50.45 41.88
VIF 2.14 2.14
Abbreviations: BIG4, coded 1 if firm is audited by big4 auditing firms, and 0
otherwise; BS, board size; FS, firm size; LEV, financial leverage; LOSS,
coded 1 if firm has loss, and 0 otherwise; MB, market-to-book ratio; NCEO,
number of female CEO in firm; NCFO, number of female CFO in firm;
NFD, number of female directors on boards; NFE, number of female
executives; NFID, number of female independent directors on boards; NFSP,
number of female supervisors on boards; REM, real earnings management;
ROA, return on assets; ROE, return on equity; SALES, growing sales.
*Correlation is significant at 10% level.
**Correlation is significant at the 5% level.
***Correlation is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 8 shows that PFD and PFID have no significant
relationship on AB_OP and AB_DE, which is similar to
the pre-results in Table 6. However, there is a positive
significant relationship between PFD and AB_OCF dur-
ing the bullish and bearish period at 5% and 1%, respec-
tively, as well as a significant negative association
between PFID and AB_OCF during the bullish and bear-
ish period at 5% and 1%, respectively. This means that
female independent directors are more likely to kerb the
operating cash flow manipulation.
Moreover, the coefficient of PFE is negatively signifi-
cant at 1%–5% level related to AB_OP and AB_DE but
not related significantly to AB_OCF in both the bullish
and bearish periods. Accordingly, the results in the rela-
tionship of AB_OP and AB_DE with PFD, PFID and PFE
in both periods are similar to pre-results in Table 6. How-
ever, the results in relation of AB_OCF to PFD, PFID and
PFE in both periods are not consistent with the results in
Table 6. Table 8 shows that operating cash flow is highly
related to female directors and independent directors but
not significantly related to female executives in both
periods, which perhaps means that female directors and
independent directors can deal with agency problems
effectively with regard to sales manipulations, and the
female independent directors are more likely to restrain
sales manipulations than female directors and executives.
Furthermore, PFSP has a negative relation to two cat-
egories of REM (AB_OP and AB_DE) in both periods but
the significance level is different. It may mean that firms
with female supervisors on board are likely to kerb over-
production and discretionary manipulation in both time
periods. However, PFSP is not significantly related to
AB_OCF in both periods, and this may indicate that
female participation on supervisors' boards in kerbing
REM occurs as a result of reducing discretionary expendi-
tures and overproduction rather than by sales
TABLE 8 The impact of female participation on the three components of real earnings management during bullish and bearish periods
Bullish periods Bearish periods
AB_OP AB_OCF AB_DE AB_OP AB_OCF AB_DE
PFD 0.001 0.031** −0.006 0.001 0.037*** −0.009
PFID −0.003 −0.017** 0.002 −0.001 −0.019*** 0.002
PFE −0.037*** −0.0003 −0.017*** −0.022** −0.008 −0.018***
ISCEO 0.008** 0.001 0.007*** 0.010 0.005 0.003
ISCFO 0.005 0.0002 0.002 0.005* 0.001 0.004**
PFSP −0.009** 0.003 −0.011*** −0.007* 0.001 −0.009***
BS 0.001 −0.002*** 0.001 −0.001 −0.001*** −0.001
FS −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001***
ROA −0.923*** −0.423*** −0.151*** −0.447*** −0.201*** −0.089***
ROE 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.006***
LEV 0.054*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.089*** 0.251*** 0.022***
SALES −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.004 0.003 0.001
MB −0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001
LOSS −0.027*** −0.010*** −0.012*** 0.010** 0.018*** −0.012***
BIG4 −0.001 −0.003 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.003
Number of obs 11,616 11,616 11,616 14,436 14,436 14,436
Adjust R2 0.163 0.060 0.0272 0.1138 0.0534
F 59.19 20.02 9.55 48.54 20.82 7.00
VIF 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.13
Abbreviations: AB_DE, real earnings manipulation in discretionary expense; AB_OCF, real earnings manipulation operating cash flow; AB_OP, real earnings
manipulation in overproduction; BIG4, coded 1 if firm is audited by big4 auditing firms, and 0 otherwise; BS, board size; FS, firm size; ISCEO, coded 1 if CEO
in the firm is female, and 0 otherwise; ISCFO, coded 1 if CFO in firm is female; LEV, financial leverage; LOSS, coded 1 if firm has loss, and 0 otherwise; MB,
market- to- book ratio; PFD, proportion of female directors on boards; PFE, proportion of female executives; PFID, proportion of female independent directors
on boards; PFSP, proportion of female supervisors on boards; ROA, return on assets; ROE, return on equity; SALES, growing sales.
*Correlation is significant at 10% level.
**Correlation is significant at the 5% level.
***Correlation is significant at the 1% level.
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manipulation. Accordingly, the relationship of PFSP with
REM in Table 8 is similar with the pre-regression results
in Table 6, which suggested that female supervisors on
boards are likely to decrease the real earnings manage-
ment, supporting Hypothesis 6.
The findings in Table 8 indicate that the coefficient of
ISCEO is positively significant related to AB_OP and
AB_DE in the bullish period, while ISCEO has no signifi-
cant impact on AB_OP and AB_DE in the bearish period.
Moreover, ISCFO is correlated to AB_OP and AB_DE in
the bearish period, while the relationship of ISCFO to
AB_OP and AB_DE are not significant in the bullish the
period. The results show that female CEOs are not more
likely to manipulate earnings through overproduction
and discretionary expense, and this is decreasing in the
bearish period, and that female CFOs tend to be more
conservative in the bullish period, supporting Hypothesis
4 and 5. However, the AB_OCF is not significantly
related to ISCEO and ISCFO during the bullish and bear-
ish periods, which may indicate that the female CEOs
and CFOs mainly implement REM by reducing discre-
tionary expenditures and overproduction rather than by
sales manipulation.
Overall, the robustness check in Table 8 is mostly
consistent with previous findings in Table 6. However,
during both periods, AB_OCF is not significantly related
to the independent variables PFE, CEO, CFO and PFSP,
but is significantly related to PFD and PFID. This may
mean that female executives and supervisor directors are
more likely to restrain manipulation of earnings with
respect to discretionary expenditures and overproduction
rather than sales.
5 | CONCLUSION
In this study, the roles of female directors and female
supervisors on boards as well as female executives in ker-
bing real earnings manipulation during the bull and bear
periods were investigated. The findings in this study con-
cluded that firms with female executives and supervisors
on their board are more able to restrain the real activity
manipulation in both bull and bear periods. Moreover,
female CEOs are more likely to limit the earnings manip-
ulation during bearish periods compared with that in bull-
ish periods, because the results in regression model show
that CEOs are more likely to manipulate earnings man-
agement during the bullish time, but the same result in
the bearish time period is not present. Also, female CFOs
are likely to kerb REM in bullish time compared to that in
bearish time for the reason that female CFOs in bearish
time cannot tolerate loss in a depressed economic context,
so that they are more likely to manage real earnings than
that in bullish time. However, the associations between
female directors, independent directors in firms and REM
during both bullish and bearish times failed to observe.
This may be because the relatively low proportion of
female participation on boards is unlikely to have an
influence on earnings manipulation, according to Joecks
et al. (2013). Although the results show that directors and
independent directors on boards have no impact on the
real activity manipulation during the bullish and bearish
periods, female executives (excluding CEOs and CFOs)
who are also directors are likely to kerb the REM in both
periods. Overall, the findings demonstrate that female
supervisors on boards and female executives, including
CEOs and CFOs, are likely to restrain managers' real
activities manipulation effectively during bear and bull
periods to some degree. Importantly, the results of the
robustness checks carried out via regression models are
effective so that the tests in this study are rigorous.
There are novel contributions in this study. Firstly,
there is limited literature exploring the relationship of
gender diversity on boards and executive during bull and
bear periods. This study concluded that female supervi-
sors on boards and executives are correlated with the
degree of REM both in bear and bull periods. The study
also concluded that the choices made by CEOs and CFOs
in earnings management during bullish and bearish
periods are different. In addition, the female directors
and independent directors are not related to REM in both
periods. This study contributes to the literature by consid-
ering the impact of gender diversity of boards (manage-
ment boards and supervisory boards) and executives on
REM during bear and bull periods. Secondly, this study
adds further evidence to support the important role of
female top leadership and may encourage companies to
improve the proportion of female directors and execu-
tives, and therefore make full use of the role of females
on firms' boards and executives, ultimately improving the
firm's performance and the quality of financial reporting
by reducing the REM.
There are some policy recommendations arising from
the results of this study. Firstly, the employment opportu-
nities for supervisors of boards and executives in Chinese
firms should be further increased to ensure gender-bal-
ance. In the Chinese context, traditional culture has
made women face the predicament of “workplace mar-
ginalization” (Li & Luo, 2016). With the change of times,
women play an increasingly important role in all fields of
society and even the proportion of female participation
on management boards and executives now exceeds
Japan, South Korea and the European continent. How-
ever, still, only 11% of women hold senior executive roles
or sit on boards, only 35% hold management positions in
China (Chen, 2019), and this still reveals significant
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under-representation. A policy of increasing the propor-
tion of female participation on supervisory boards and
executives in firms may help to kerb the REM effectively
and improve the quality of financial reporting, and this is
of benefit to firms' long-term development and the inter-
ests of its outsider investors. Furthermore, additional
opportunities on boards and in executive roles for women
could help to mitigate prejudice against women and
increase their employment opportunities so that they can
use their talents effectively in their fields. Secondly, this
research shows there is an opportunity for companies to
concentrate on the effect of employing female executives
and supervisors in overproduction and discretionary
expense manipulations when they try to control earnings
management. Female executives and supervisors in firms
are likely to restrain manipulate earnings in the aspect of
discretionary expenditures and overproduction rather
than sales alternation. Moreover, CEOs are more likely to
manipulate to earnings in bullish periods and CFOs are
more likely to manage earnings during bearish periods.
Companies should consider the different time and con-
text of the market when considering agency problems in
earnings management, and the investor should be more
cautious in both bullish and bearish periods. Thirdly,
most of the listed firms in China were in the manufactur-
ing industry, which provides an opportunity for the gov-
ernment to place increased attention to the earnings
management within the manufacturing industry.
Finally, there are some limitations to this study. The
sample country in this study is different from United
Kingdom and United States, as we have selected only
Chinese A-share listed companies. In addition, the corpo-
rate governance of the sample companies is relatively
weak and the relevant institutions are not developed
enough. Moreover, the effectiveness of female participa-
tion on boards and executives in firms of China is limited.
Since the very large listed Chinese firms are included in
the sample need to be analysed. These firms have a low
proportion of females on boards and in executive roles.
Thus, the actual impacts of female participation in firms
on earnings management may be limited in the research.
Furthermore, due to potential measurement errors, the
measurement of REM is specific but incomplete, and per-
haps since some time has moved on since the data were
gathered, some of the data may be out of date or not
completely accurate. Thus, for any further research, a bet-
ter measurement should be developed to fully capture the
exact extent of REM to make it more realistic. It would
also be advantageous for the opinion and conclusions of
research in this study to be tested in a more diverse back-
ground. At the same time, female participation on boards
of management on REM in different contexts should be
tested in more depth since this study failed to find the
relationship between directors and -independent direc-
tors on REM during the bear or bull period.
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ENDNOTES
1 The ST-firm means that they have experienced loss for two con-
tinuous years, in April 1998, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges provided special treatment for stock transactions of
listed companies with abnormal financial status or other condi-
tions. Thus, the data in ST firms are not suitable for this study
due to its speciality.
2 The financial industry, especially the banking industry, is different
from other industries. For instance, most of the revenues from
banking are from off-balance sheet (transactions?). It is unreason-
able and unconvincing to use data only from financial statements
to analyse the listed firm within the financial industry. In this
study, because all analyses are based on firms' financial statements
data, thus the data of the financial industry should be excluded.
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APPENDIX




Code 2000 2005 2006 2007 2010 2012 2015 2017 Total
Agricultural 1 13 27 28 29 32 42 41 40 252
Mining 2 9 19 20 22 32 39 43 39 223
Manufacturing 3 462 712 703 715 912 1,344 1,402 1,502 7,752
Energy 4 20 41 42 47 56 57 54 30 347
Construction 5 11 21 23 25 36 46 48 42 252
Wholesales and retails 6 74 87 85 84 85 101 98 90 704
Transportation 7 17 32 30 39 54 66 69 31 338
Accommodation and restaurant 8 6 6 5 6 6 7 7 8 51
Information technology 9 25 36 32 37 58 116 136 151 591
Real estate 11 44 52 48 44 60 53 47 25 373
Business services 12 7 11 13 13 14 20 22 17 117
Special technical services 13 0 0 0 0 4 9 17 20 50
Environmental management 14 6 11 9 7 12 12 15 15 87
Electronic products 15 3 4 3 2 6 7 12 7 44
Journalism and publishing 18 4 4 4 4 6 11 14 17 64
Comprehensive 19 54 53 52 49 54 50 42 17 371
Total 755 1,116 1,097 1,123 1,427 1,980 2,067 2,051 11,616
TABLE A2 Sample distribution by year and industry during the bearish period
Bearish period
Year
Industry Code 2001 2002 2003 2004 2008 2009 2011 2013 2014 2016 Total
Agricultural 1 18 20 21 22 29 28 41 43 42 39 303
Mining 2 12 15 15 18 29 30 36 44 43 37 279
Manufacturing 3 552 598 638 674 827 858 1,163 1,426 1,370 1,418 9,524
Energy 4 23 28 34 37 53 56 59 58 58 31 437
Construction 5 12 13 15 19 32 33 39 50 49 37 299
Wholesales and retails 6 82 85 89 90 87 92 94 104 99 84 906
Transportation 7 20 23 26 31 53 52 60 73 70 32 440
Accommodation and restaurant 8 7 7 6 6 9 8 7 9 7 7 73
Information technology 9 26 29 32 38 42 48 90 134 129 134 702
Real estate 11 48 53 53 53 55 61 65 54 52 27 521
Business services 12 9 10 11 12 15 15 18 19 20 17 146
Special technical services 13 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 11 10 16 50
Environmental management 14 7 9 10 10 10 11 11 13 13 14 108
Electronic products 15 4 4 4 4 5 7 7 13 14 8 70
Journalism and publishing 18 4 4 3 3 5 5 11 15 14 14 78
Comprehensive 19 60 57 57 56 54 49 49 50 46 22 500
Total 884 955 1,014 1,073 1,308 1,356 1,757 2,116 2,036 1,937 14,436
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